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In baseball, a run scored on offense carries the same on-field (win) value as does a run prevented on defense. Both outcomes bear the same score margin implication. This presumption of unit equality is implicit in the Wins Above Replacement (WAR) measure, which treats units of offensive WAR (oWAR) and units of defensive WAR (dWAR) as perfectly substitutable toward win production. The purpose of this paper is to ask whether the salaries of Major League Baseball (MLB) players reveal such an equal valuation among MLB teams.

The authors examine the relationship between offensive output, defensive output and subsequent salary from free agency in MLB using a set of log-linear OLS, fixed effects regression specifications.

In general, estimated annual salary from free agency increases significantly and substantially with unit increases in a player's (prior season) wins above replacement WAR. Across specifications, the authors estimate a 42.5–43.4% increase in salary for year t for each additional unit of WAR in year t−1. The authors disaggregate WAR into offensive and defensive components (oWAR and dWAR) and estimate a 52.4–53.3 (4.8–7.2)% increase in salary for each additional unit of oWAR (dWAR).

The efficiency of the baseball labor market has been studied previously with mixed results. The novelty of the present study is its treatment of inputs not as positions or individual players but as the underlying offensive and defensive win production of players. The authors estimate free agency salary returns to (contract season) oWAR and dWAR in MLB to establish whether (to what extent) a salary premium for offensive output exists within MLB.

This paper examines the innovation behavior of family-owned firms versus non-family-owned firms. The role of internal family governance and the influence of external stimuli (competition) on innovation are also considered.

The data of 20,995 family and non-family firms across 38 countries are derived from the World Bank Enterprise Survey during the period 2019–2020. Probit models are used to examine the impact of family ownership, family governance, and competition on innovation outcomes.

Family firms are more likely to make R&D investments, acquire external knowledge, engage in product innovation (including innovations that are new to the market) and process innovation, relative to non-family firms. However, a high propensity of family member involvement in top management positions can reduce innovation. Competition has a negative impact on innovation outcomes for both family and non-family firms, but it has a positive moderating effect on the innovation activities of family firms where a higher level of family member involvement in management is present.

This paper provides novel insights into family firm innovation dynamics by identifying family firms as more innovative than non-family firms for all types of indicators, debunking the idea that family firms are conservative, reluctant to change, and averse to the risks in innovation activities. However, too much family involvement in decision making may stifle some innovation activities in family firms, except in cases where the operating environment is highly competitive; this provides new insights into the ownership-management dynamic of family firms.

Since recent research has found that offensively oriented players receive a salary premium, the current study recognizes this observed premium might exist because offense is worth more in terms of revenue generation. Given the popular sports saying, “Offense sells tickets, defense wins championships,” the authors quantify whether offense really does sell more “tickets” than defense in the NBA.

Using NBA team revenue data as well as team offensive and defensive win shares, the authors estimate several econometric specifications to test if teams generate more revenue for offensive wins compared to defensive wins. The authors also employ a multi-year free agency study to identify if NBA players receive more compensation for offensive production than they do for defensive production.

The authors find no statistical difference in revenue generation from offense compared to defense. The authors confirm these findings both before and after revenue sharing. These results are also robust to alternative specifications. Therefore, the authors conclude that fans do not prefer offense to defense in terms of their spending. Contrary to previous research, the authors find no evidence of an offensive premium paid to NBA players.

Based on their findings, offensively oriented players should not receive a salary premium. The clear implication for team decision makers is that offensive production should be compensated at a similar rate as defensive production. Since the authors do not find evidence of an offensive premium for offensive production, their research suggests a likely labor market equilibrium in the NBA for both profit-maximizing and win-maximizing teams.

Sports economists have consistently found that winning positively impacts team revenue fans prefer to allocate their entertainment dollars to winning teams. Previous research has also found that fans do not have a preference for how their team wins. However, this research ignores the significant variability in revenue that can exist between teams with similar attendance figures. The authors contribute to the literature by testing whether profit maximizing teams should pay different amounts for different types of production by estimating the marginal revenue product of a win due to offense, defense and pitching.

Using data from the 2010–2017 Major League Baseball seasons and an Ordinary Least Squares-Fixed Effects approach, the authors test whether a unit of offensive, defensive and pitching production generates differing amounts of team revenue both before and after revenue sharing. The authors then test if team Wins Above Replacement is a good approximation of actual wins while accounting for the previously observed nonlinear relationship between wins and revenue.

The authors found that marginal revenue product estimates in the postrevenue sharing model for mowar, pwar and dwar are nearly identical to each other. Further, after predicting prerevenue sharing, the authors find that fans have no preference for mowar, pwar or dwar play styles.

The findings illustrate that team decision-makers appear to be acting irrationally by paying more for offense than they do for defense. Thus, the findings suggest that team decision-makers should value defensive wins and pitching wins at the same rate as offensive wins on the free agent market.

This paper aims to attempt to bring together various organisational aspects that have never been collectively investigated before in the strategic management literature. Its main objective is to examine the relationship between “strategic orientation” and “firm performance”, in the light of two firm-specific factors (“distinct manufacturing capabilities” and “organisational structure”). The proposed research model of the present study is built upon the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and the organisational aspect of the VRIO framework (the “O” from the VRIO model).

The study proposes a newly developed research model that adopts a four-factor approach, while examining a number of direct and indirect effects. The examination of the proposed research model was made with the use of a newly developed structured questionnaire that was distributed on a sample of Greek manufacturing companies. Research hypotheses were tested using the structural equation modelling technique. The present study is explanatory (examines cause and effect relationships), deductive (tests research hypotheses), empirical (collects primary data) and quantitative (analyses quantitative data that were collected using a structured questionnaire).

The empirical results suggest the coexistence of three distinct categories of effects on “firm performance”: strategy or “utility” effects, depending on the content of the implemented strategy; firm-specific effects, depending on the content of the organisational resources and capabilities; and organisational effects, depending on the implemented organisational structure. More specifically, the statistical analysis underlines the significant mediating role of “strategic orientation” and the complementary role of “organisational structure”. Finally, empirical results support the argument that “strategy follows structure”.

The use of self-reported scales constitutes an inherent methodological limitation. Moreover, the present study lacks a longitudinal approach because it provides a static picture of the subject under consideration. Finally, the sample size of 130 manufacturing companies could raise some concerns. Despite that, previous empirical studies of the same field, published in respectable journals, were also based on similar samples.

When examining the total (direct and indirect) effects on “firm performance”, it seems that the effect of “organisational structure” is, almost, identical to the effect of “distinct manufacturing capabilities”. This implies that “organisational structure” (an imitable capability) has, almost, the same contribution on “firm performance” as the manufacturing capabilities of the organisation (an inimitable capability). Thus, the practical significance of “organisational structure” is being highlighted.

There has been little empirical research concerning the bundle of firm-specific factors that enhance the impact of strategy on business performance. Under the context of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, the present study examines the impact of “organisational structure” on the “strategy-capabilities-performance” relationship, something that has not been thoroughly investigated in the strategic management literature. Also, the present study proposes an alternate measure for capturing the concept of business strategy, the so-called factor of “strategic orientation”. Finally, the study adopts a “reversed view” in the relationship between structure and strategy. More specifically, it postulates that “strategy follows structure” and not the opposite (“structure follows strategy”). Actually, the empirical data supported that (reversed) view, challenging the traditional approach of Chandler (1962) and calling for additional research on that ongoing dispute.